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THE PHYSICIAN'S DECISION-MAKING ROLE
IN ABORTION CASES
MARY JULIA REGAN MARCIN, M.D.
Howard County (Maryland) Public Health Service

and
RAYMOND B. MARCIN, J.D.
The Catholic University of America
I. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S VIEW

The United States Supreme Court has, of course, severely restricted the power of states to regulate abortions. But in doing so, it
has recognized a large and not well defined role for the physician-in the abortion itself, of course, but also in the abortion
decision:'
For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester,
the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical
2
judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.

and:
Up to those points [the end of the first trimester approximately], the
abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a
medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the
3

physician. [Emphasis added.]

Thus the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the abortion
decision in all its aspects is inherently and primarily a medical
'To decide to abort a fetus is an immense step, an enormity with grave medical,
religious, and psychological implications. Who makes that decision? How is it made?
What factors are taken into account when such a decision is made? What factors
ought to be taken into account? These quite relevant questions have not yet received
their due exploration. The legal authority in the wake of the Supreme Court's recent
actions is that the abortion decision rests with the pregnant woman. But the
physician, too, has a legal and obviously a medical share of that decision. This article
(1) explores the physician's legal role, as seen through the words of Justice Blackmun,
and the physician's medical role, as seen both empirically and in current medical
literature, (2) assesses the current state of affairs in physician abortion counseling,
and (3) suggests a synthesis which blends the physician's legal and medical roles with
a proper regard for the enormity of the abortion decision.
2
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
3
1d., at 166.

PHYSICIAN'S ROLE IN ABORTION CASES

decision. What aspects, then, comprise the abortion decision? Justice Blackmun, in his opinion for the majority in Doe v. Bolton, has
given an answer of sorts:
... [M]edical judgment may be exercised in the light of all
factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well being of the patient. All these factors
may relate to health. This allows the attending physician the room he
needs to make his best medical judgment. And it is room that operates for the benefit, not the disadvantage, of the pregnant woman. 4
[Emphasis added.]
What sort of physical, emotional, psychological, and familial
factors did Justice Blackmun have in mind? In Roe v. Wade,
Blackmun listed a sampling of "factors the woman and her respon5
sible physician necessarily will consider in consultation":
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force
upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm
may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child
care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a
family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In
other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing
6
stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
Clearly the role of the physician in the abortion was seen by
Blackmun as beyond that of the clinician. Indeed at another point,
Blackmun fantasized over
the conscientious physician, particularly the obstetrician, whose
professional activity is concerned with the physical and mental
welfare, the woes, the emotions, and the concern of his female
patients. He, perhaps more than anyone else, is knowledgeable in this
area of patient care, and he is aware of human frailty, so-called
"error," and needs. The good physician-despite the presence of
rascals in the medical profession, as in all others, we trust that most
physicians are "good"-will have a sympathy and an understanding
for the pregnant patient that probably is not exceeded by those who
7
participate in other areas of professional counseling.
4
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191 (1973).
5
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
6

1d.

7

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 196-97 (1973).

THE JURIST

This judicial proclamation of near omniscience on the part of
physicians is curious in light of Blackmun's clear recognition of
"vigorous opposing views, even among physicians"' concerning
abortion:
One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges
of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes toward
life and family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color
one's thinking and conclusions about abortion. 9
Thus Blackmun simultaneously upholds the physician's judgment in the abortion counseling setting and recognizes "vigorous
opposing views

. . .

among physicians" in that same setting. The

image created is a curious one: The only persons whose competence
is seen as capable of resolving the difficult abortion decision
dilemma are themselves acknowledged to be influenced by the same
sociological factors that color everyone's thinking and conclusions
about abortion. Is Blackmun too trusting or too candid? The choice
is not a comfortable one, and one might hope for a third alternative,
in the form of a common-sense fusion of Blackmun's images. To
this fusion we shall presently return.
II. A MEDICAL PERSPECTIVE

We have seen Justice Blackmun's view of the physician's role in
the abortion decision. The physician's own view of that role is not
dissimilar.
The physician's initial task when confronted with a request for
an abortion is, of course, to confirm the suspected pregnancy. An
estimated twenty to thirty percent of criminal abortions performed
prior to Roe and Doe were on non-pregnant women.' 0 To repeat or
even approximate that figure today would obviously be poor medicine.
Beyond pregnancy confirmation, the physician may be expected
to perform screening, counseling, decision-making, referral, and
follow-up functions."
SRoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116(1973).
9
1d.

'0j. Butler, M.D., and B. Fujita, B.A., Abortion Screening and Counseling. A Brief
Guide for Physicians, 50 Postgraduate Medicine 208 (1971). See also A. Margolis,
M.D., Some Thoughts on Medical Evaluation and Counseling of Applicants for
Abortion, 14 Clinical Obstetrics and Gynecology 1255 (1971).
"j. Butler, M.D., and B. Fujita, B.A., Abortion Screening and Counseling. A Brief
Guide for Physicians, 50 Postgraduate Medicine 208 (1971). A. Margolis, M.D., Some
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The screening function should include both medical and socio2
psychological considerations.'
Medical Screening and Counseling
Good medical screening clearly involves the taking of a careful
history, a physical examination, and laboratory tests.' 3 Beyond these
screening activities, the physician will discuss several medical
considerations with the patient: the type of procedure to be performed and the possible complications. 4 The procedures most
generally performed during the first trimester are vacuum aspiration, dilation and curettage, or both. Major complications of the
first trimester abortion include hemorrhage of greater than 500 cc of
blood, infection with febrile morbidity (defined as a temperature
above 100.4'F persisting for more than 24 hours), and uterine
perforation. Complications of the second trimester abortion include
hemorrhage, infection, and failure of the primary induction, requiring a second procedure in cases of saline-induced abortions. 5
Sociopsychological Screening and Counseling
The purpose of sociopsychological screening is to determine
whether the patient wants the termination immediately and will be
satisfied with the decision.' 6 If done properly, the screening will
involve many elements of counseling. The physician will be aiming
to discover whether the patient has any religious conflicts about
Thoughts on Medical Evaluation and Counseling of Applicants for Abortion, 14
Clinical Obstetrics and Gynecology 1255 (1971). R. Pasnau, M.D., Contemporary
Psychiatric Consultation: Evaluation or Rehabilitation?, 14 Clinical Obstetrics and
Gynecology 1258 (1971). J. Bragonier, M.D., Ph.D., and C. Ford, M.D., Preabortion
Evaluation: Selection of Patients for Psychiatric Referral, 14 Clinical Obstetrics and
Gynecology 1263 (1971). M. Bracken, M.P.H., G. Grossman, M.D., M. Hachamovitch, M.D., D. Sussman, M.S., D. Schieir, M.S.W., Abortion Counseling: An
Experimental Study of Three Techniques, 117 American Journal of Obstetrics and
Gynecology 10 (1973). N. West, M.D., and M. Walsh, The Need for Pre-Abortion
Counseling-Now More Than Ever, 59 Nebraska Medical Journal 34 (1974).
'21d. See Butler and Fujita, at p. 210.
'MED-CHI Guidelines for Physician Performance of Induced Abortions. 1973
Maryland State Medical Journal 68.
4
On complications, see F. Glenc, M.D., Early and Late Complications After
Therapeutic Abortion, 118 American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 34 (1974).
1SD. Evans, M.D., and J. Gusdon, M.D., Medical and Surgical Complications of
Therapeutic Termination of Pregnancy, 35 North Carolina Medical Journal 87
(1974).
6
1 J. Butler, M.D., and B. Fujita, B.A., Abortion Screening and Counseling. A Brief
Guide for Physicians, 50 Postgraduate Medicine 208, 210 (1971).
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abortion, whether the patient has any unresolved doubts at all, who
wants the abortion, whether there are any conflicts with parents or
relatives about the abortion, whether the patient has received prior
counseling on abortion, and whether the patient will want followup therapy (e.g., contraceptive advice or fitting). 7 Sociopsychological screening is a delicate function because the patient being
screened is almost by definition in a stressful dilemma.' 8 "Frequently the dilemma that encompasses the pregnant woman, be it
social or economic, compels her to regard termination of the
pregnancy as the only resolution .
1.5." Almost never will she
analytically assess her options, discarding the odious ones and
weighing the acceptable ones. In theory, she has at least five or six
options depending on her marital status: (1) attempt a self-induced
abortion, (2) seek an illegal abortion, (3) request a legal abortion, (4)
if single, marry and keep the child, (5) if single, remain so and keep
the child, (6) if single, remain so and place the child for adoption, (7)
if married, keep the child, (8) if married, place the child for adoption.2 0
There is a dilemma involved in the physician's role in sociopsychological screening and counseling, not unlike the curious doubleimage of the physician painted by Justice Blackmun. The curiosity
of Blackmun's simultaneous near deification of the physician's
judgment and recognition of vigorous opposing views among
physicians did not escape Bernard N. Nathanson, M.D., who wrote
of the physician's role in the abortion decision in the November 18,
1974, issue of the New England Journal of Medicine.2'
Dr. Nathanson's story began in 1969 when he became an organizer of the National Association for Repeal of Abortion Laws (now
known as the National Abortion Rights Action League). NARAL
was successful in its efforts to persuade the New York State Assembly
to pass a "liberalized" abortion law in 1970. With the enactment of
7

1 J. Bragonier, M.D., Ph.D., and C. Ford, M.D., Preabortion Evaluation: Selection
of Patients for Psychiatric Referral, 14 Clinical Obstetrics and Gynecology 1263, 1269
(1971).
18Bragonier and Ford would question the general applicability of this statement.
19N. West, M.D., and M. Walsh, The Need for Pre-Abortion Counseling-Now
More Than Ever, 59 Nebraska Medical Journal 34 (1974).
20
Butler and Fujita list only seven options, omitting the last-i.e., if married, place
the child for adoption. 50 Postgraduate Medicine 208, 211 (1971).
"1B. Nathanson, M.)., Sounding Board-Deeper into Abortion, 291 New England Journal of Medicine 1189 (1974).
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that law, Dr. Nathanson became director of the Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health, described by him as "the first-and
largest-abortion clinic in the Western world." 2 2 Dr. Nathanson's
recent fame no doubt results from his own published assessment of
his work at the Center-this subsequent to his resigning the directorship:
The Center had performed 60,000 abortions with no maternal deaths
-an outstanding record of which we are proud. However, I am
deeply troubled by my own increasing certainty that I had in fact
presided over 60,000 deaths.
There is no longer serious doubt in my mind that human life exists
within the womb from the very onset of pregnancy, despite the fact
that the nature of the intrauterine life has been the subject of
23
considerable dispute in the past.
Dr. Nathanson's radical reassessment of when human life begins
does not, however, affect us directly in this inquiry. It is to his views
on abortion consultation and the abortion decision that we turn:
Somehow, we must not deny the pervasive sense of loss that should
accompany abortion and its most unfortunate interruption of life. We
must not coarsen our sensitivities through common practice and
24
brute denial.
Dr. Nathanson differed from Justice Blackmun in his assessment of
the physician's ability to counsel directively on the emotional,
moral, and sociological aspects of the *abortion decision:
I offer no panacea. Certainly the medical profession itself cannot
shoulder the burden of this matter. The phrase "between a woman
and her physician" is an empty one since the physician is only the
instrument of her decision, and has no special knowledge of the moral
dilemma or the ethical agony involved in the decision. Furthermore,
there are seldom any purely medical indications for abortion. The
decision is the most serious responsibility a woman can experience in
2
her lifetime, and at present it is hers alone.
If physicians do not usually delve into the emotional, moral, and
sociological aspects of the abortion decision in their consultations
with pregnant women seeking abortions, who usually does? Dr.
22

1d. See 286 New England Journal of Medicine 403-407 (1972) for an accdunt of

the Center's activities.
23291 New England Journal of Medicine 1189 (1971).
24
25

1d.
1d.
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Nathanson's empirical observation was that those aspects of the
decision are usually entrusted to "the narrow partisanship of
committed young women who have had abortions and who typically staff the counselor ranks of hospitals and clinics now.''26 Dr.
Nathanson's suggestion?
Can there be no help for the pregnant woman bearing the incalculable weight of this moral tension? Perhaps we could make available
to her-though it should by no means be mandatory-a consultative
body of unique design, much like Saint Simon's Council of Newton.
To meet the new moral challenges of the Abortion decision, we may
very well need specialists, some of new kinds, to serve on such a
body-a psychohistorian, a human ecologist, a medical philosopher,
an urbanologist-clergyman. The counseling that such a body could
offer a pregnant woman would be designed to bring the whole sweep
of human experience to bear on the decision .... 27
Thus the incongruity-Justice Blackmun certainly recognized
the "physical, emotional, psychological, [and] familial" 28 awesomeness of the abortion decision, but in relegating those formidable
considerations to consultation between "the woman and her responsible physician," 29 was he being simplistic? Dr. Nathanson would
seem so to conclude.
And what of the "familial" considerations involved in the
abortion decision? What are "familial" considerations? Justice
Blackmun mentioned the problems of the unwanted child, the child
who is not likely to receive sufficient parental care because of
psychological or other inabilities, and the stigma of unwed motherhood.30 These are all, in a sense, familial considerations. But what of
other familial considerations? Does the physician have a consultative responsibility to consider paternal rights, whatever they may be?
Justice Blackmun, of course, expressly declined to consider "the
father's rights, if any exist in the constitutional context, in the
abortion decision.'"'3 But one recent state court decision, Murray v.
Vandevander,32 provides some measure of guidance. The Murray
decision did not involve the question of abortion, but its reasoning
seems fairly analogous to the problem of the physician's responsibil11ld., at 1190.
27M., at 1189, 1190.
2
1Supra, n. 4.
2

9Supra, no. 5.
d

30

3

'Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973), ftnte. 67.
Murray v. Vandevander, 522 P.2d 302 (Okl. App. 1974).

32
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ity to consider paternal rights in the abortion decision. In Murray,
Dr. D. C. Vandevander had performed a hysterectomy on Artie V.
Murray, the wife of the plaintiff. Mr. Murray alleged that Dr.
Vandevander "induced, and by the means of overreaching and
unprofessional medical advice, prevailed upon ... [his] wife . . . to
submit to such surgery, .... " and that he [Murray] ". . . had warned

and specifically notified said defendant that he did not approve, but
in fact, strenuously objected to the performance of such surgery.""3
Murray's theory of recovery was loss "of consortium and 'the right to
reproduce another child.' "34 The Court of Appeals of Oklahoma
found "that the right of a person who is capable of competent
consent to control his [sic] own body is paramount" and ruled that
consequently "[t]here was no necessity for the physician in the
instant case to obtain the consent of the plaintiff [husband]." 5 If
this line of reasoning holds true for the abortion decision,36 there
would seem to be little for the physician to fear from the possibility
of a later assertion of paternal rights.
III. A

SYNTHESIS

What, then, is the physician's role in the abortion decision? Are
there only two alternatives: Blackmun's semi-deification of the
physician's counseling competence or Nathanson's cumbersome
committee of assorted specialists? There is a middle ground between
Blackmun and Nathanson, a ground which will enable the physician to discharge the counseling responsibility to the full extent of
Blackmun's confidence as well as Nathanson's concern for practical
competence, and a ground which will provide a measure of concern
for potential paternal and other familial rights. Both Nathanson
and Blackmun (though Blackmun less obviously) viewed the physician's counseling role as directive. But there is another widely
accepted and used counseling approach that is particularly amen33

1d., at 303.

341d.
35
1d., at 304.
36
1t is admitted, of course, that the cases are easily distinguishable. In Murray, the

court saw the issue as the husband's "right to a child-bearing wife as an incident of
their marriage." Id. The abortion context, of course, involves the assertion of a
paternal right to protect "potential human life." Justice Blackmun was clear in
stating that the State has an interest in protecting such life (though its interest does
not become "compelling" until viability). '10 U.S. 113, 163. But the question still
remains: Does the prospective father have an interest which is "compelling," and if
so, to what extent must a physician respect it?
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able to abortion counseling: placing the counselee in touch with her
own feelings.
There are, of course, different theories of counseling. The direct
method, usually seen as appealing to lawyers for its brisk, brasstacks approach, tends to emphasize dynamic intervention. The
counselor brings a new force into the situation and to some extent
adopts the counselee's problem as his or her own. Intervention,
understandably, involves a shifting of a large measure of responsibility for the contemplated decision over to the counselor. On the
other end of the spectrum, school, marriage, psychological, and
pastoral counselors have usually favored the nondirective, sometimes called Rogerian, method. The nondirective method focuses on
allowing the counselee to ventilate her own feelings. The counselor,
in a nonjudgmental but controlled manner, listens, comments when
appropriate, and in general tries to place the counselee in touch
with her own feelings enough so that the counselee can make the
appropriate decisions. Both methods (really extremes-there are
other methods in between) require some attention to, and control
of, the ego defense mechanisms which interfere with one's ability to
accept advice (directive) on the one hand, and one's ability to assess
one's own true feelings with relative objectivity.3 7
The question arises: Which method of counseling is more appropriate for the patient who is faced with the abortion decision? It
is Dr. Nathanson's view that the type of counseling pregnant
women contemplating abortions are presently receiving is decidedly
directive: "the narrow partisanship of committed young women
who have had abortions and who typically staff the counselor ranks
of hospitals and clinics now.""8 Nathanson, of course, recognizes
that another type of counseling is more appropriate-the type that
provides the woman with enough informational input to enable her
to make her own decision unassisted. 9 Moreover, Justice Blackmun's recognition of the abortion decision as one fraught with
emotion and piercing to the essence of the decider's own personal
value system 40 would seem to involve a call for the nondirective type.
In 1971, more than a year before Roe and Doe, Dr. Julius C.
Butler of the University of Washington School of Medicine and
37

See H. Freeman and H. Weihofen, Clinical Law Training-Interviewing and
Counseling (1972).
18291 New England Journal of Medicine 1189, 1190 (1974).
9

3 1d.
40

Supra, n. 8.
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Byron N. Fujita, counselor and research assistant, had occasion to
address this very problem. Their conclusions:
The core consideration in counseling is to determine whether the
pregnancy should be terminated or continued to term. Of primary
importance, of course, is the patient's attitude toward abortion....
As much as possible, other involved persons should be included in
the discussion, although time should be allotted for private discussion. These include the involved male and the parents when appropriate and possible. The involved male should be included in the
discussion with the patient because he should assume a part of the
responsibility. He may be important in resolving the immediate crisis
in the patient's subsequent sexual adjustment. 1
Butler and Fujita seemed to contemplate both directive and
nondirective counseling, especially in the context of the prospective
father's participation in the discussions. If one were to focus purely
on the nondirective method as the more appropriate approach to
abortion counseling, what role do the interests of the prospective
father play? What do the interests of the involved male have to do
with the true feelings of the pregnant woman? In some cases,
obviously very little or nothing. But in others, perhaps everything.
Just as the pregnant woman must be aided through all the usual ego
defense mechanisms to her own true view of the nature of abortion
and its place in her own true value system or religious orientation,
so too must she be aided to her own view of her spouse's or the
involved male's posture with respect to the decision. For some,
abortion will mean little more than the removal of an unwanted
appendage. For others, it will mean an act of the most severe moral
consequences-so severe that future coping may be difficult or
impossible. Similarly, the reaction of the involved male, his viewpoint, his projected reaction, may be of no true significance to the
woman. But to some it may be overwhelming, indeed so formidable
that the counselor can accurately project that any post abortion
adjustment will be too difficult.
The interests of parents is a similar, though not identical,
consideration. A year ago, Dr. A. Frans Koome of Washington State
was convicted of performing an abortion on an unmarried minor
without first obtaining the consent of her parents. Such consent was
required by Section 9.02.070 (a) of the Revised Code of the State of
Washington. Koome's conviction was reversed by the Washington
41

J. Butler, M.D., and B. Fujita, B.A., Abortion Screening and Counseling: A Brief
Guide for Physicians, 50 Postgraduate Medicine 208, 211, 212 (1971).
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Supreme Court which held that the consent requirement interfered
with the minor's constitutionally guaranteed right of privacy. 2 The
case, of course, is a geographically limited precedent, and physicians
in other states will, no doubt, be wary of similar state consent laws,
but the case suggests another consideration. Are there counseling
reasons, apart from statutory compulsions, which mandate, or at
least suggest the advisability of, including parental considerations
in the decisional equation? And, of course, there are. Butler and
Fujita viewed the consideration apart from the point of view of the
minor:
When appropriate, discussion with parents should be encouraged,
particularly if the patient is under age 16. Almost without exception,
younger women do not like to tell their parents. They fear parental
reactions of shame or disappointment or a threatening posture.
Oftentimes, the fact of intercourse, which the pregnancy exposes,
causes the gravest concern for parents and should be fully discussed.
Clinical experience has shown that openness with the parents about
the predicament, especially if initiated by the patient, has a better
chance of eliciting emotional support, something the patient may
43
desperately need.
Again, Butler and Fujita seemed to contemplate both the directive
and nondirective types of counseling. It may be, from the counseling
point of view, that the patient needs no parental emotional support
whatsoever despite her tender age, or it may appear from precounseling interviews that parental interests would be counterproductive
and make it more difficult for the young patient to get in touch with
her true feelings. The other side of the coin is that the interests of the
parents may, and if Butler and Fujita's view is accepted, usually will
be beneficial and productive. In that case, thorough and competent
nondirective counseling would include those interests.
But whatever theory of counseling one prefers, it is clear that the
physician, for good or ill, has been entrusted by the United States
Supreme Court with an unprecedentedly large measure of official
counseling responsibility, and much needs to be done to aid the
physician who wishes to discharge this responsibility in a sensitive
and humane manner.
42
See
43

State of Washington v. Koome, 530 P.2d 260, 263 (Wash. 1975).

J. Butler, M.D., and B. Fujita, B.A., Abortion Screening and Counseling: A Brief
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